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CLARIFICATION OF PARTIES AND FACTS
Parties:

In discussing the case, respondents1 brief has at

various times referred to the wrong party oi entity, apparently
through inadvertance, but extensive enough to perhaps cause some
confusion.

For example, on page 33, respondents state that "...

Amenity presented some self serving evidence...", and on page 26
that "...Amenity received the value...", and on page 25, "...
whether the distribution of stock by Amenity was a disposition
for value."

Such misstatements in respondents1 brief may not be

material in all instances, but it was felt pertinent to call
attention to the fact that Capital General Corporation and not
Amenity is the party to this appeal; and that it was Capital
General Corporation who distributed the stock by way of gift and
who allegedly received value therefrom, and its vice president
testified at the hearing, not Amenity, etc.

Nor is the appellant

corporation a "he" or a "his" notwithstanding various such
designations in respondents1 brief.
Facts:

It appears appellant was wrong in its footnote on

page 4 of its brief in predicting that respondents would not deny
the stipulation reached at the first hearing June 19, 1986.
Respondents' brief has denied not only the stipulation, but that
such hearing even occurred.

Counsel for respondents acknowledges

that he was not counsel at the time of the hearing, but instead
of inquiring of prior counsel who was present at the hearing he
cites R. 28 and 75 as proof that there was no hearing.
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On the

contrary these pages in the record support appellant's claim that
a hearing was held.

R. 75 is a notice of the hearing, and there

is nothing in the record or otherwise to indicate it was ever
cancelled or continued to a different date.

R. 28 is the first

page of the findings and recommendations of the administrative
law judge, dated October 28, 1986, and the second line has reference to the missing stipulation in that it states that counsel
for the respective parties "agreed" to submit the matter on
memoranda.

The administrative law judge must have obtained the

facts for his findings of fact

(R. 28,29) from said "agreed"

upon stipulation since no evidence had been presented by anyone
up to that time.

Even respondents' brief (page 34) refers to the

evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing as "additional"
evidence, indicating their knowledge that there had been some
prior time that evidence was received, i.e. the stipulation.
Clearly respondents' denial of the occurrence of the hearing
and stipulation is irresponsible.

Respondents are empowered to

hold hearings before themselves and are charged with keeping
accurate records of such proceedings.

Having failed to do so

with respect to the said June 19, 1986 hearing, and thereafter
trying to cover it up by claiming it didn't occur (even though

Said facts, though not word for word, follow pretty closely the
stipulation which is further indication of its existence.
-2-

t h e r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e with c o r r o b o r a t i v e r e f e r e n c e s

) , would make

one wonder how r e s p o n d e n t s can keep a s t r a i g h t face w h i l e a c c u s ing someone e l s e of bad

faith.

Appellant i s confused,

t o say t h e l e a s t , a t t h e m o t i v e s of

r e s p o n d e n t s 1 in t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s m a t t e r in t h e i r
At t h e t o p of page 5, a p p e l l a n t i s c r i t i c i z e d for f a i l i n g
o b j e c t p r e v i o u s l y , and a t t h e bottom of t h e same p a g e ,
d e n t s say t h a t a p p e l l a n t could not have o b j e c t e d i f
t o (with a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d ) .

brief.
to

respon-

i t had wanted

In r e s p o n s e , a p p e l l a n t would c a l l

a t t e n t i o n t o t h e comments of c o u n s e l for a p p e l l a n t a t t h e b e g i n ning of t h e o n l y e v i d e n t u a r y h e a r i n g t h a t was e v e r held (R. 118,
page 15) which show a s p i r i t of c o o p e r a t i o n and t h a t

appellant

See also R. 118 at 3, 4 and 15 for unchallenged references to the f i r s t
hearing which respondents now deny occurred, and there are others. See also
R. 78 where respondents admit at least to an "informal meeting" at which sanething was "agreed" between the partie's. I t was because such admissions were
equivocal that counsel in his District Court memorandum challenged respondents
to state their position with respect to the stipulation unequivocally and
offered to submit affidavits if respondents were to deny i t . Attached to said
memorandum was another copy of the written stipulation, and i t would be presently part of the record on appeal but for the fact that the Salt Lake County
Clerk's Office has misplaced the entire memorandum. Personnel in the Clerk's
office are presently looking for i t , and appellant intends to submit another
copy if they are unsuccessful. In any event, in respondents' responsive
memorandum in the District Court, respondents' former counsel did not deny the
stipulation, but did disagree with sane of the factual matters contained in i t
based on what he considered conflicting facts which came out of the January
20, 1987 evidenitary hearing. Appellant, in i t s s t i l l ever persevering s p i r i t
of cooperation, does not object to such as i t has r^ever intended to prevent
any facts from being considered. To remedy respondents' said failure to keep
a proper record, attached to this reply brief as an addendum i s a current
affidavit of counsel for appellant respecting the occurrence of said hearinq
and the proceedings thereat.
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was willing to provide any information requested and answer any
questions any of the respondents or their counsel may wish to
ask.

In other words, there has never been an attempt on appel-

lant's part to limit respondents only to the evidence in the
stipulation.

Appellant's posture and attitude from the beginning

has been, and still is, that it has wanted the ruling on the
merits, not on technicalities or by taking advantage of the
opponent's mistakes.

Furthermore, because appellant has had no

reason to know that respondents failed to retain the said written
stipulation in the record, it has had no reason to protest such
failure or make specific statements or introduce evidence in
later portions of the record to establish it or its contents,
etc.

Having personally handed the written stipulated facts to

the Division when it held its first hearing June 19, 1986, how
was counsel possibly to know that the Division was going to fail
to put it in the record or deny that it occurred.
Respondents' brief wonders of what impact is the missing
stipulation since appellant does not seek to limit respondents
only to those facts.

The answers are:

1. The written stipulation of facts received on June 19,
1986 and discussed in some detail at that time was part of an
opinion of counsel, one of two received by appellant, discussing
statutes and precedents indicating there is no registration
requirement respecting the gifted shares. This, in corroboration
with appellants testimony at the later evidentiary hearing that
it sought and followed the advice of counsel (R. 17), totally
does away with respondents' bad faith argument as it establishes
an intent to comply with the law and a belief that it had.
2. Appellant should not be limited to facts received subsequent to the stipulation, as it relied on said document being
-4-

part of the record as represented by respondents on June 19,
1986. There were no subsequent facts adduced inconsistent with
the stipulation or which are damaging to appellant's postion, but
that isn't reason to omit part of the record.
Respondents don't
believe this anyway f and it appears they have sought to exclude
it because of inconsistencies they perceivej.
3. Respondents 1 discussion of this point is obviously aimed
at casting doubt on appellant's credibility, but the attempted
cover up has only cast doubt on their own. While appellant's
failure to object earlier is due to the fact it didn't know the
document had been omitted and because of its cooperative spirit
in supporting the inclusion of all material evidence, respondents
have little more to say in defense of their failure to meet their
obligation of keeping accurate records of their proceedings than
that if appellant doesn't ] ,i ke i t, it car i si le (Respondents' brief
at page 6 ) .
Discussion of factual clarifications to this point has
ce?

.'•- ts 1 omissions from the record

• r-'

- - footnote 1

on page 7 ui respondents' brief, there is again .
respondents 1 part to cast doubts on : ne
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conveyed to counsel, a rather innocent situation to be sure since
the number of companies doesn't matter anyway.

But it can be

seen that respondents cannot resist a personal attack after
discovering there were more than 30 companies.

Perhaps it never

occurred to respondents in their drafting of said footnote that
counsel for appellant was relying on the record and had no reason
to question it.
The comments in said District Court brief are still appropriate even though it turned out the numbers were wrong.

This is

because the number of companies is simply not relevant, and
respondents' preoccupation with high numbers, as is again indicated in said footnote, shows their insensitivity to the real
issues of the case.

The conduct of appellant in the gifting of

shares in Amenity is either legal or it isn't, and if it's legal
with one company, it's legal with 10 or 50, etc.

If there is no

speed limit, as was the case in parts of Nevada prior to the
energy crunch, it matters not if one travels fast one time or a
hundred times.

Instead of discussing irrelevant numbers, appel-

lant would direct attention to the real issues of the case.
These have to do with the rights of citizens in reading statutes
to rely on their plain meanings in conducting their affairs, and
the obligations of legislatures to define with clarity what is
against the law, and the obligations of regulating agencies to
follow those plain meanings the same as is expected of the
citizens.
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respondents to nave
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-

n^
- J ^ ^

*,,

*

produce

icies xctws /aere

Respondents have not met U le

challenge.

Instead they have made unsupported assertions in

attempting to cast doubts on the authorities cited by appellant,
and they have cited cases, not having anything to do with gifts,
about how securities laws are to be liberally construed, etc.,
but they have failed to grasp the real issue and attack it.
With respect to the second issue, that of the good or bad
faith nature of appellant's gifts, in response to appellant's
challenge to show even one shred of evidence of appellant's bad
faith, respondents state only that the "good faith and sincerity
of the giver" is not what counts.

No facts are offered, and the

bad faith finding is still a mere supposition and unsupported
conclusion.

Respondents' bad faith argument is nothing more than

saying that the lack of registration is in and of itself the
evidence of intent to violate the law, but without establishing
it is against the law or that there was any intent to violate the
law.

Nor did respondents' brief refute the evidence presented on

good faith.
Response to appellant's third point, that respondents have
no statutory authority to bring an action under §14 for a violation of the registration requirements of §7, was not even
attempted by respondents.

Respondents have evidently misunder-

stood appellant's argument in this regard, as they spent the
portion of their brief in response to it supporting the doctrine
that respondents have been given statutory authority to issue
summary orders prior to a hearing, something appellant has made
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS1 POINT I:
RESPONDENTS1 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE
UNSUPPORTED AND UNREASONABLE.

Appellants do not take issue with the quoted language of
Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, 74 4 P.2d
320f (Utah App. 1987) to the effect that the decisions of respondents' should be reversed if they are outside the "tolerable
limits of reason."

However, respondents are attempting to estab-

lish by said case that the definition of "sale" or "sell" is
"special law" and that therefore the respondents can place
whatever meaning on it they may determine in the exercise of
their "expertise."
Respondents' failure to follow the plain meaning of the
statutes is in and of itself outside of the tolerable limits of
reason and is against the law.

Respondents have not taken issue

with the numerous authorities cited in Point I of appellant's
brief that courts must follow the plain meaning of the words used
in statutes, but they seek to overcome such by the simple expediency of the "special law" doctrine.

Should agencies (which do

not have the status of either courts or legislatures) be under
any lesser standard than the courts in being required to follow
the plain meaning of the words used?

To accept a yes answer

ignores the fact that the reason for the plain meaning doctrine
in the first place was not that courts lack the "expertise" of
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agencies and therefore aren't qualified to make the interpretations, but that the rights of the citizens who read and rely on
the plain meaning of the words must be protected.
The obvious logic that agencies are under no less an
obligation than courts to follow the plain meaning of legislative
pronouncements is fully backed up by numerous precedents.

The

Utah Supreme Court in Olson Construction Company v. State Tax
Commission, 361 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1961), at page 1113, stated that
an administrative interpretation "contrary to the express provisions of a statute cannot be given weight and, to do so, would
in effect amend the statute."

(Citations to other cases).

That

such is the law is so obvious that no doubt one could find a
similar quote in many cases in every state in the country.

See

for example Gibb v. Spiker 718 P.2d 1076 (Hawaii 1986) at page
1079:

"An agency statutory interpretation, though, cannot

contradict the clear statutory language..." and State Department
of Social and Health Services v. Island County Juvenile Court,
740 P.2d 907 (Wash. App. 1987) at page 911:

"There is no need

for deference to an agency's interpretation if the statute is not
ambiguous."
This latter quotation perhaps best harmonizes the claims of
the appellant and the respondents with respect to statutory
interpretation by administrative agencies, that is, deference to
agency interpretation is indeed the correct rule of law, but it
comes into play only if it is first made to appear that the words

-11-

used by the legislature are ambiguous.

It is obvious there is

nothing ambiguous in the words "sell" or "give" and hence no
deference is due to the agency's interpretation of "sell" to
include "give."
Technomedical Labs, Inc. supra, is not out of harmony with
the above reasoning.

In discussing special law the Court des-

cribes it as those terms that bespeak a legislative intent to
delegate their interpretation to the responsible agency.

There

is nothing in this statute that indicates an intent to delegate
the definition of word "sell" to respondents.

The legislature

has chosen a well understood word to begin with and in addition
has defined it in the statute and provided examples.

This shows

an intent to establish the statute's meaning by the words used,
and not to leave any of it for respondents or anyone else to
interpret.
In a further attempt to support their position in this
regard, Respondents have quoted the title of the Act and emphasized certain provisions therein, but none of the quoted material
(respondents' brief, p. 13) has anything to do with the claimed
right of respondents to alter the plain meaning of the words
"sale" or "sell" by the use of alleged "expertise."

For example,

the portion underlined by respondents merely indicates that the
changes enacted in 1983 modified prior definitions, not that
respondents have such authority.
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POINT II. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II:
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT IS IN
HARMONY WITH THE POSITIONS ESPOUSED BY APPELLANT AND
NOT WITH THOSE ESPOUSED BY RESPONDENTS.
Respondents seek to overcome the clear wording of the
statutes by use of the "legislative purpose^' doctrine.

Appellant

has no disagreement with the general statements found in numerous
cases, one of which is quoted in respondent^1 brief, to the
effect that securities laws are remedial in nature and should be
broadly and liberally construed to give effect to the legislative
purpose, that such laws are to prevent fraud, encourage the
disclosure of information and protect investors from sales of
fraudulent and worthless securities, etc.
anything to do with this case.

But none of that has

There is no allegation of fraud

or worthlessness or speculativeness of the securities in this
case, and there are no investors.

This casje involves whether a

citizen of this state is allowed to give away securities without
registration, or to be more specific, does §7 of the Act prohibit
it.

Yet respondents can't resist references to things like

"ingenious subterfuge by fraudulent means" (page 15), etc., all
of which are impertinent and introduced as inuendos against
appellant's character to take attention away from said real issue
of the case.
In Point II respondents have discussed the various provisions of the Act with respect to registration and point out that
registration provides protection not only for initial purchasers

-13-

of the issue, but also subsequent purchasers.

Respondents1 have

not argued that the registration of gifted stock is needed to
protect the giftees, but that the registration provisions of the
Act show a purpose that such gifts be registered in order to
protect subsequent purchasers.

Instead of accepting such

unsupported speculation, appellant would urge the Court that the
purpose of any act can best be determined by careful study of its
provisions and tnat respondents' analysis of the Act, while
referring to some of the relevant provisions, is incomplete and
misleading.

Appellant will supplement it as follows:

Section 61-1-11(8) of the Act is the key section for an
understanding of the interaction between the registration process
and the exemption process in secondary trading situations.

Said

subsection 8, cited by respondents, establishes that a registration expires in one year.

That is, anyone selling stock who com-

plies with §7, i.e., registers the stock with the Division, will
still be in violation of §7 if he makes sales beyond the one year
period (unless of course he comes within an authorized exemption
under §14). In other words, after a year is up the stock is in
the same situation as if it had not been registered.

As was

pointed out in appellant's brief on page 33, §7 is an either/or
statute, i.e., to sell stock one must either register it or come
within one of the exemptions under §14. There is no other way
one can sell stock under the statutory scheme of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.

And §11(8) establishes that the registration

-14-

aspect is only valid for one year, and that thereafter all sales
come under §14.
So this matter is really quite simple if one will take the
time to read the statutes.

Pursuant to the either/or language of

§7, one must comply with §§8, 9 or 10 cited by respondents on
registrations of stock (the either), or with §14 (the or) for
unregistered stock, which includes both stock which has never
been registered and previously registered stock after its one
year registration expires.

Sales of a stock which has never been

registered must fit within one of the exemptions in §14 from day
one whereas sales of previously registered stock need do so only
after the one year period.
Now that this is all clear, it can easily be seen that while
it cannot be denied that registrations also protect subsequent
purchasers, it is equally obvious that the converse is not true,
i.e. that there must be registration or secondary purchasers will
be left unprotected.

This is because §14 is to protect purchas-

ers of all unregistered stock, and it does not apply to any stocK
that is registered.

Clearly there is no other way to interpret

the statutory scheme and the legislative intent other than that:
1. Protection is provided to secondary purchasers (as
well as original purchasers) of registered stock for the first
year by the registration statements under §§8, 9 and 10 and
supplements to it under §11(9), and after the first year by the
exemptions under §14, and
2. Secondary purchasers (as well as original purchasers) of unregistered stock are protected under the exemptions
under §14 at any time, including the first year.
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Therefore respondents' claim that because the gifted stock
is not registered, secondary purchasers do not nave the benefit
of the protection they would have had for the first year had it
been registered is begging the question.

The problem in respon-

dents1 argument is that §14 does not require that secondary
purchasers of stock (now remember, §14 exemptions have application only to unregistered stock), whether previously registered
or not, receive prospectus type information, i.e. the fact they
donft receive it is statutorily approved (provided it fits a §14
exemption).

Such claim of respondents1, tnough correct, is not

an argument against appellant's position but merely a correct
statement of how the statute works.
Respondents' are saying in effect that since the same kind
of protection for the first year as would be provided in a
registration statement is not provided in the present case, the
registration provisions must apply.

But that totally ignores the

language of §7 which says you can sell stock either/or, i.e.,
either if it registered, or if it comes within an exemption.
Respondents are reading into the statute that either/or means
either registration or exemption after first registering and the
registration has expired.

But not only is such totally contrary

to the wording of §7, there is nothing anywhere in the Act that
states, implies or suggests that the exemptions of §14 were to
apply only to stocks that had been previously registered, and its
specific provisions overwhelmingly indicate to the contrary.

-16-

To

t w i s t the s t a t u t o r y scheme and s p e c i f i c provision as respondents
have done i s c l e a r l y beyond the " t o l e r a b l e l i m i t s of reason." and
in fact i t i s much worse than t h a t i J
Respondents have sought to advance t h e i r p o s i t i o n by
suggesting t h a t the requirements under §14 are not rigorous
enough to be adequate p r o t e c t i o n t o i n v e s t o r s in the secondary
market.

They say t h a t the r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements in the Act

are very d e t a i l e d and provide f u l l d i s c l o s u r e , whereas the
information requirements under §14 are limited and t h e r e f o r e a
I

company l i k e Amenity, if the lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s reversed,
w i l l be a bad thing for secondary purchasers because of the lack
of more d e t a i l e d information about the stock.

If indeed i t

is

t r u e t h a t §14 information requirements are d e f i c i e n t , the obvious
remedy for t h a t i s for the l e g i s l a t u r e to beef up the r e q u i r e ments of §14, not for respondents to disregard i t s p r o v i s i o n s and
i n t e r a c t i o n with the e i t h e r / o r provisions of §7.

Furthermore,

the same c r i t i c i s m (if t r u e at a l l ) would apply t o any r e g i s t e r e d
company beyond the f i r s t year.

That i s , j u s t because more com-

p l e t e information was provided i n i t i a l l y , the s t a t u s of p a r t i c u l a r companies, i . e . , t h e i r f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , t h e i r

officers,

I t doesn't help respondents' position (but may confuse, hence this
footnote) for them to say (p.18) the disclosure required by §14 is an update
of the prior disclosure under a registration. Although i t may have that
effect in a particular instance, there's nothing in the statute that states or
implies exclusiveness of application to the type of unregistered stock wnich
was previously registered. Nor, in view of the clear and unequivocal
either/or operation of §7, can such be presumed.
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all of the other information cited in respondents' brief that
must be supplied in registration statements, etc. sometimes
changes rather rapidly, and after the first year when the secondary purchasers have only the protection of $14, such purchasers
are no better off because the company was initially registered
than they would be in a case like Amenity where the stock was
originally gifted and not registered, i.e., the more detailed
information furnished some time ago, whicn may have no resemolance to current information, would be useless.
In summary, the either/or statutory scheme enacted by the
legislature provides such protections to purchasers as is desired
by the legislature.

Clearly such legislative scheme establishes

that the vast majority of protection of secondary purchasers in
all companies is provided in the §14 exemptions, the only exception being the first year for registered stock.
for that exception is also clear:

The reasoning

the legislature does not deem

the §14 provision to be adequate protection to initial purchasers
of a public offering.

Why?

Because these people are paying

their cash to a new untried enterprise, which also establisnes
why §7 doesn't apply to gifts - because those people aren't paying anything.

And even though appellant acknowledges that regis-

tration statements sometimes do provide information to secondary
purchasers during the first year, it is obvious (again, if one
will take the time to read the statute) that the purpose of the
one year provision, §11(8), and the very next subsection (9)
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requiring supplemental information during the one year, is that
it takes about that long in many cases to sell out the issue to
the initial purchasers, and the possibility of it also providing
information to secondary purchasers during that year is only
incidental, if it was thought of at all by the legislature.
A careful reading of the argument in Point II of respondents1 brief will show that such argument has accomplished
nothing mpre than inform readers that the statutory provisions
are inadequate to accomplish their desires in this particular
case and not that the failure to register the gifted stock
violates the purpose of the securities laws.

Furthermore, the

suggestion of respondents respecting deficiencies in the protections of §14 are mere unverified assertions anyway.

It is true

they are less demanding than the registration provisions, but the
legislature apparently feels they are adequate.

The parade of

horrors in respondents1 brief of possible scenarios relating to
donees trying the sell their stock and other things is just so
much speculation and not based on any facts in or out of the
record.

Specifically, with respect to the speculation in foot-

note 3 on page 19, it is clear that even if such were the case,
respondents have their remedy and could bring an action to
suspend the trading if it did not come within a §14 exemption as
therein speculated.

But that is not what respondents are

attempting to do here.

(See Point III of 4ppellantfs brief).
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Another problem with respondents1 conclusion and the
speculative parade of horrors used to support it is that while
their point was that the gift distribution violated the purposes
of the Actf i.e. that the gifting of stock by appellant is an
evil the legislative purpose is against, they failed to respond
to appellant's point on pages 29 and 30 of its brief, that when
the speculation has been put aside, there are no facts to show
that any secondary purchaser of the gifted stock has made any
complaint or has been hurt or has needed protection some two
years after the gifts took place.

And if there were an evil,

appellant respectfully submits that the American way is to
legislate it away with clear and unmistakable language rather
than do violence to the language not only of the specific
section, §7, but the entire statutory scheme.

POINT III. APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS NOT ANl
OFFER OR SALE.
Appellant agrees it made offers of stock to the giftees, but
not for value.

Appellant does not dispute that "sale" is broader

as used in securities laws than in commercial transactions.

It

is obvious from the legislative enactment that the Utah Legislature considered it to be broader because it defined specific
examples - some of which in commercial usage might be called a
trade or something else.

These examples, however, listed in

§13(15)(c), clearly show the intent of the lawmakers was only to
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make it clear that anything which exacted value from the recipient would be considered a salef not that gifts would be considered sales, as argued by respondents.

Every single itemized

example in the Utah Act is an example where the recipient provides some value.

Such is totally consistent with appellant's

brief in which it was pointed out on pages 13 and 14 that the
obvious difference between a gift and a sale is that even though
a gift also provides something for the giver that it connotes a
bargain and a contractually agreed upon consideration, i.e.,
value provided by the recipient for the stock, whether it be in
connection with a bonus or an assessment or some other trade of
property from the recipient.

Further, since the legislature

decided to list examples of "gifts" which are sales, the fact the
legislature did not list the type of gifts in this case conclusively establishes that such are not to be considered as sales.
That this cannot be refuted is seen in the fact that the two
examples of "gifts" cited by respondents (315(15)(c)(i) a bonus
and (ii) assessable stock) are not gifts at all but are merely
ways of exacting a purchase price from the recipient.
Respondents have relied upon two Federal spin-off cases to
the effect that the value need not flow directly from the recipient in order to constitute the value required to make a "disposition for value," and hence, a sale.

Sinc^ appellant admits it

received benefit (though not from the recipients) from making the
gifts, it is argued that these cases are controlling.
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However,

it is readily apparent that the spin-off cases are distinguishable as having nothing to do with gifting of stock.

In the

present case the benefits received by appellant are only
incidental to the gifts, i.e., not directly related, could have
been received in a different way, were speculative, i.e., only
hoped for, and the recipients paid nothing for the gifts, i.e.
had no investment or contract rights.

In contrast, in the spin-

off cases, the recipients of the stock had paid something for the
right to receive the stock (their initial purchase of stock), and
so even though there is discussion in the cases about that value
accruing to the defendants, such as the enhanced value of a
public company, such value could never have arisen or be discussed at all had not the recipients purchased stock in the parent
company which entitled them contractually to their pro rata snare
of the spin-off stock.

That is no different than the bonus situ-

ation is under §13(15)(c)(i) of the Utah Act, i.e., the original
purchase of stock in the parent company entitled the purchaser to
the "bonus" of the stock of the subsidiary.

Under those facts

the recipient still paid value for both stocks, and it was therefore not necessary for those courts to do as much violence to the
English language to determine that the distribution of the stock
was a sale.

In stark contrast, in the present case there is no

relation at all between the recipients of the stock and any value
or purchase they may have made to the ultimate benefit to
appellant.
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In summary, although respondents have cited both cases and
statutes, neither involve true gifts as those in the present case
are acknowledged to be, and in both the statutory and case law
examples cited by respondents the recipients did in fact pay for
their shares.
Next, respondents suggest that the authorities cited by
appellant in its brief are not valid as precedents.

The devast-

ating effects to respondents1 position coming from the case of
Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938, (Utah 1935) are such that respondents took no less than five pages to respond to this one case to
attempt to show that it was not analogous or applicable.

In

attempting to do this respondents have made unsupported statements such as, "neither the aim nor the effect of the distribution was to create a publicly held company."

It doesn't matter

whether it was or not, because there is nothing in the statute
which would make §7 apply differently if the aim or effect
to create a publicly held company.

w as

So this misstatement ot

respondents' is perhaps not relevant, but it's another example of
their attempts to confusion the issues.

Nevertheless, in

response appellant would point out that such information as
asserted by respondents is not found in the Andrews opinion, and
the implication therein is strictly to the contrary since the

Further, there is nothing in the record to support respondents' assertion on page 22 that the purpose of appellant's gift distribution was to create
a public company. That was, however, one of the effects, among many others.
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gifts were "...to such members of the public as would receive
it

" 2 £ a t Pa9e 939.

Respondents 1 chief argument a g a i n s t Andrews i s t h e i r claim
t h a t the 1963 L e g i s l a t u r e overruled i t in enacting the Uniform
S e c u r i t i e s Act.

There are l o t s of reasons why t h i s i s n ' t s o .

To

begin with, i t s t r e t c h e s the imagination t o suggest t h a t some
t h i r t y years l a t e r in the adoption of a uniform act prepared o u t s i d e the S t a t e by o t h e r s t h e r e was any i n t e n t t o consider the old
1935 case a t a l l .

More s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s the fact t h a t

the provision of the old s t a t u t e discussed in Andrews was not
changed in the new enactment.

The s p e c i f i c issue discussed in

Andrews was whether the g i f t s c o n s t i t u t e d a d i s p o s i t i o n "for
value" within the meaning of the s t a t u t e , and t h a t has not
changed.

The a d d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n added in the 1963 t o t a l

enactment of a new law did not change the b a s i c "for value"
requirement or a f f e c t the v a l i d i t y of the reasoning of the
Supreme Court quoted on page 17 of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f .

I t merely

carved out an exception for a "purported g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e
stock."b

Also of s i g n i f i c a n c e i s t h a t if the l e g i s l a t u r e

Obviously there is no value paid for a gift of assessible stock unless
and until the assessment is made and paid by the recipient. And equally
obvious is that the legislature in 1963 simply decided that since such
assessment would in all likelihood be the intent of the distribution, i t might
as well stop i t at the outset by carving out the exception and thus avoid the
issue that was lost in Andrews. In reality, by carving out the exception, the
legislature rather than overruling Andrews has acknowledged i t s correct
application of the "for value" test, and hence the need to exempt assessible
stock fron such test and simply define i t as a "sale."
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i n t e n d e d t h a t a p u r p o r t e d g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k be a s a l e ,
what if i t i s a r e a l g i f t

and not j u s t a " p u r p o r t e d "

gift?

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k in t h e Andrews c a s e was o n l y
voluntarily assessible.b

But even w i t h o u t g e t t i n g i n t o i s s u e s of

whether i t was v o l u n t a r i l y a s s e s s i b l e or o t n e r w i s e , or whether

it

was a p u r p o r t e d g i f t or an a c t u a l g i f t of a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k ,

the

main flaw in r e s p o n d e n t s 1 a t t e m p t s t o d i s c r e d i t Andrews i s

that

even if t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d i n f a c t i n t e n d t o o v e r r u l e t h e

result

with r e s p e c t t o a s s e s s i b l e s t o c k , i t cannot p o s s i b l y have

affect-

ed t h e more b a s i c h o l d i n g t h a t "had t h e lawmaking power i n t e n d e d

Because of i t s significance to t h i s appeal and the conflicting claims of
the p a r t i e s , included in the addendum to t h i s reply brief i s the entire
opinion in Andrews. Note the dissent's extensive discussion of the difference
between normal assessible stock and the voluntary assessments there involved.
This provides a better understanding into the unusual nature of the voluntary
assessments, i . e . they were different than those exempted from the "for value"
requirement by the 1963 legislature.
In addition, although respondents quote and take comfort in the dissent's
statements, a reading of the entire dissent shows they have taken Justice
Hanson's statements out of context, i . e . he does not question the present
appellant's position that the law does not apply to g i f t s , but he merely
provides various reasons why he thinks the transfers of the assessible stock
was not a gift even in the ordinary plain meaning of the word. In the present
case not even respondents challenge that appellant's transfers were true gifts
under ordinary usage. So i t can be seen that if the present case were before
the 1935 Supreme Court, whether before or after the 1963 enactment, there
would be no dissent and Justice Hanson would go with the majority since none
of the reasons he cited that the transfers of assessible stock are not true
g i f t s are even remotely involved in the present case.
See also the
appellant's brief
provisions of the
g i f t s . Appellant
but i t s doctrines
present case, and

Supreme Court's arguments (at page 941) similar to those in
on page 20 (unresponded to by respondents) examining other
Act in concluding i t did not show a purpose to regulate
recommends reading the entire case - i t may be an old one,
are timeless and irrefutable. I t is on "all fours" with the
i t has not been overruled.
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the Act should apply to gifts of securities, it would have been a
simple matter to have so provided,"

At best, the legislature has

provided only that "purported gifts of assessible stock" are
exempted from the said holding.

Clearly, the legislature cannot

overrule the holding in Andrews because it is based on such obviously correct principles and unchallenged authority, to-wit, that
if a legislature is going to prohibit conduct, it is a simple
matter to spell it out and their obligation is to do so in plain
English so that people can understand it (see Point I of appellant's brief and authorities there cited).

To attempt to

overrule that would be unconstitutional.
The fact is, the Andrews case still stands firmly in place
in support of appellant's position totally, whether or not the
1963 amendment referred to by respondents can be considered as
having changed the result of the case as applied to assessible
stock.

The fact that the legislature has determined that pur-

ported gifts of assessible stock should be registered is not
support for the proposition that the gifts of Amenity stock
should be registered, but on the contrary is further evidence
that they should not, i.e., the fact that the legislature was
specific with respect to the gifts of purported assessible stock
eliminates other kinds of gifts of stock.

Further, the fact that

the 1983 amendment establishing that a purported gift of assessible stock is a sale as part of the same amendment establishing
that a good faith gift is excepted raises serious doubts as to
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respondents' entire good faith gift argument, i.e. it indicates
that the good faith gift amendment was added to allow somebody to
give assessible stock in good faith and not be accused of a
"purported gift." 7
Respondents have suggested that the other cases cited by
appellant in its brief are "wholly inapplicable."

Appellant

respectfully requests respondents to please read them again.
Appellant cited a total of four cases, including the Andrews
case, which dealt specifically with person^ giving away securities with the issue as to whether or not such was a violation of
specific securities laws relating to the prohibition of sales of
securities.
is.

If that is not applicable, appellant wonders what

In contrast, respondent has not cited a single case that

involves even remotely any gifts of securities.

Respondents'

brief gives as its "most compelling case" Technomedical Labs,
Inc. v. Utah Securities Division, supra, but it has nothing to do
with the giving of stock.

But that's what the present case is

about, i.e., does §7 of the Act prohibit the giving of stock
without registration?

Obviously the federal cases, Truncale v.

Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S. Dist. N.Y. 1948) and Shaw v.
Dreyfuss, 172 F.2d 140 (S. Cir. 1949) cited by appellant are

This is logical because it would indeed be bad faith to give a
"purported gift" of assessible stock with the intent to thereby exact
consideration from the donee. It's not a real gift, it's a lie, and so it's a
bad faith transfer.
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based on a different statute other than §7 of the Utah Securities
Act.

But the issue is the same, i.e., the securities laws

involved in those cases contain the same question, i.e., whether
the gifts of securities constituted sales, and for respondents to
style said cases as "wholly inapplicable" or not remotely related
is further indication of respondents1 brief's consistent
unsupported statements and attempts to confuse the real issue of
the case.

As an indication that respondents have not even read

these cases they say don't apply, see top of page 32 of respondents' brief in which respondents represent in their brief that
Shaw involved gifts to charities, when in fact the case did not
apply to charities, and the dissenting opinion specifically
stated it did not (at page 143). Respondents have pointed out
that those companies were already public companies, yet that
doesn't seem to be material to anyone but respondents, i.e., the
statute makes no distinction, etc.

Nowhere in the statute or in

the case law is there any provision establishing that an act
which is otherwise legal under the statute, i.e., giving stock,
becomes illegal within the provisions of the Act if the effect is
to create a publicly held company.

POINT IV.

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV:
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART
OF APPELLANT.

Respondents' brief states on page 33, "The Act does not
concern itself in this setting regarding good faith with the
sincerity of the giver...."

At page 24, appellant's brief
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pointed out specific evidence in the record showing appellant1s
good faith intent and that there was no contrary testimony
introduced.

In response respondents refuse to discuss the

specific evidence but seek to avoid such by asserting that it
doesn't matter about the good faith and sincerity of the giver!
Arbitrary and capricious?

You bet!

In the above quoted

admission, respondents have acknowledged that they ignored the
evidence in the record and that no amount of evidence of the good
faith of appellant would have been sufficient.
Appellant has no disagreement with respondents1 definitions
of good faith and citations therein.

Nor does appellant dispute

that if there is any evidence that appellant intended to evade
the requirements of the law, appellant would be guilty of bad
faith.

But there isn't any such evidence.

It accomplishes

nothing for respondents to recite some of the factual history as
they have done on pages 34 and 35 of their brief, as these are
only inuendos at best and have no real bearing on the question of
the good faith of appellant.

While it is unclear just what point

is being made of the fact for example that appellant received a
fee for performing services (should they work for nothing?) and
the other matters listed, it is clear that as pointed out in
appellant's brief (p. 27) respondents' conclusions that appellant
is guilty of bad faith are not based on the facts bearing on
appellant's intent, but are based solely on the fact that there
was no registration.

That is, respondents have merely presumed
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that no registration is irrefutably equated to bad faith.

That

such is arbitrary and capricious and severely restrictive of the
rights of one attempting to comply with the law is obvious.

Lack

of registration of gifts does not amount to bad faith or any
intent to circumvent any laws when the undisputed evidence in the
record shows that the giver intended to comply with the law,
sought legal advice, would have registered had it been advised to
or believed that it was required, is still willing to register if
such is the law, and had no intent whatever to do anything
outside of the law.
It is not known nor has it been stated whether or not the
trading of the shares referred to in respondents1 brief was
illegal, i.e., a violation of §14 of the Act, but if there were
any trades that did not comply with §14, there is no evidence
that it was the intent of appellant that such happen or that such
would not have happened had there been a registration, and
certainly respondents have a remedy to prevent such trades
without the necessity of asserting the fiction that appellant is
guilty of making bad faith gifts because they weren't registered.
Contrary to respondents1 suggestion on page 35, there is
nothing typical about a grandfather giving his grandson a stock
certificate.

Nor is there any indication that the statute was to

apply to such to the exclusion of other good faith gifts. On the
contrary, appellant is entitled to rely upon the wording of the
statutes and the advice of counsel in determining whether or not
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to register gifts of stock, and since the statutes clearly do not
require such (or at the very least, and everyone should be able
to admit this, do not appear to require such) respondents claim
that failure to register displays an intent to evade the statutory requirements is nothing but a circuitous argument and in
reality is only a policy statement on the part of respondents
that they would like to require gifts to be registered.

But the

decision in the case must rest upon the law and the facts, not on
respondents1 desires.
Once again, respondents fall back on their claim of expertise and technical knowledge in this area of "special law" in
drawing their conclusions.

However, their findings and conclu-

sions are out of the tolerable limits of reason and are arbitrary
and capricious because they ignore the statutes and the intent of
appellant and simply conclude that because registration was not
done there must have been some evil intent.

That truly is

arbitrary and capricious and is only in furtherance of their plan
to create their desired result irrespective of the law and the
facts.

POINT V:

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS1 POINT V:
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENT, POINT III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, THAT THE
REMEDY SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY
STATUTE.

In respondents' discussion in Point V, the brief continues
the pattern of attempting to confuse the real issues by bringing
in allegations and speculations not in the record and other
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unsupported assumptions and "parade of horrors" type statements
without basis.

It is unclear whether respondents1 discussion of

irrelevant matters is to give the appearance of having answered
the points of appellant without having done so or because of lack
of understanding of such point.

For example, respondents1 have

stated that appellant has claimed that §14(3) can only be exercised by them after the fact, i.e., that they can't shut the door
to the hen house until all the chickens are out.

Respondents

have stated that appellant is "nonplused" and "dead wrong" (page
42) and the brief goes on to spend a considerable amount of
detail in setting appellant right.

The problem with such is that

appellant has never made any of those claims attributable to
it!

Of course appellant would be dead wrong if it claimed the

respondents didn't have powers to summarily suspend exemptions
under §14(3).

Appellant has never suggested that it is nonplused

at that type of authority, but it is now nonplused at
respondents' having made such allegations and having felt the
need to discuss it, particularly in light of the fact that no
such summary order was ever issued in this case.
Appellant does not question respondents' authority under
§14(3) to issue summary orders suspending exemptions under §14.
What appellant stated in its brief was that their ability to do
so, whether it be a summary order or after a hearing, is
dependent on a criteria and that criteria is whether or not the
particular transaction or security being suspended in fact comes
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within one of the described exemptions of §14.

In this case,

respondents have suspended the trading of Amenity, Inc. stock
based on an alleged violation of §7. Assuming such a violation,
nowhere in §14, subsection 3, or anywhere else in the statute is
such authority given, whether summarily prior to a hearing or
after three hearings as was done in this ca$e.

As pointed out in

the main brief, if there is any violation ot §7 by appellant in
its gifting of stock, the remedy is provided in §§2U and 21 (see
Point III of appellant's brief).

Section 14 is limited to issues

relating to §14 exemptions, and respondents nowhere in their
pleadings or in their arguments have made ajiy claim that any
exemptions have been violated.
To be sure it is clear:

Suppose ABC Company sold stock to

the public for cash without registration in violation of §7.
Respondents could bring severe punishments against ABC and its
principles under §§20 and 21, but they can do nothing under
§14.

Not only is that the clear statutory language, but the

reason for such is obvious.

A suspension of exemptions under §14

would only add further hurt to the very people the Act is to
protect - first they unwittingly buy stock without the protections of registration, and now respondents are going to tell them
they can't sell it even if exemptions under §14 are complied
with!

(See Point II above and Point III in appellant's brief).
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CONCLUSION
Respondents have sought to sustain their position by
personal attacks, inuendos and skirting the issues and discussing
irrelevant and redundant material to take attention away from the
real issues in the case.

The real issues of the case involve the

statutory authority of regulatory agencies, their right to alter
the plain meaning of legislative enactments, go against established precedents, etc. and the right of the public to be secure
in relying on the English language, common meanings and prior
precedents in interpretating statutes governing their conduct.
Appellant once again, as a member of the public, asks the above
Court for protection against respondents.

Appellant's brief

conclusively establishes that the conduct of appellant is not
prohibited by statute, that it acted in good faith, and that even
if there were violations the remedies sought by respondents is
not authorized by statute.

Respondents have failed to refute any

one of these points.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1988.

((b^$ \£L
David H. Day
DAY & BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Petitioner
and Appellant
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Affidavit re June 19, 1986 hearing proceedings and
stipulation.
Andrews v. Chase opinion.

AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)
(ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

David H. Day, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
1.

That he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Utah, and that he makes this affidavit as an officer of
the Court to supply information relative to missing portions of
the record in the appeal before the Court of Appeals of the State
of Utah, Case No. 870567-CA
2.

That on or about the second week of June 1986 his client

and appellant in said appeal, Capital General Corporation,
presented him with a copy of a petition and notice of hearing on
said petition, scheduled for June 19, 1986, before Stephen
Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge, of the Utah Department of
Business Regulation.

A copy of said petition and notice of

hearing is in the record in the said appeal, pages 73, 74 and 75.
3.

That he appeared at the time and place set ror said

hearing with David R. Yeaman, president of appellant.

Also

present were Sherwood Cook of the Utah Securities Division and
Nicholas E. Hales of the Utah Attorney General's Office,
representing the Division.
4.

That the Division, through Mr. Hales and Mr. Cook,

suggested that the matter could be handled on legal memoranda
based on stipulated facts, provided that we could stipulate to

the facts at such time, and if so, it would not be necessary to
have the administrative law judge come down and be present, but
he could decide it based on the said stipulated facts and written
memorandums of law to be filed.
5.

That he presented a letter addressed to his said client

from himself, dated February 13, 1986, and suggested to Mr. Cook
and Mr. Hales that it was his understanding that the facts of the
case were as represented on the first two pages of said letter.
Mr. Yeaman affirmed that those were the facts, and he answered
additional questions of Mr. Hales or Mr. Cook.

Mr. Hales and Mr.

Cook read said factual description and both indicated that that
would be used as the stipulated facts and delivered to the
administrative law judge.

It was also agreed that the Division

would file its memorandum first, the undersigned would file
second, and the Division would file a reply, and dates were
agreed upon for such filings.
6.

That he personally handed said stipulated facts to the

Division's said representatives, with the understanding that such
would become part of the record.

That he had never at any time

prior to the Final Order of the Department of Business Regulation, dated February 18, 1987, had any indication from any
attorney or other personnel of, or representing, the Division
that such was not the case, and that he did not learn that it had
apparently been omitted by the Division until after the Final
Order was entered while preparing for the District Court review.
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7.

That the second hearing held September 25, 1986, was not

agreed to as part of the stipulation, as the stipulation original
invisioned that the administrative law judge would make his
ruling based on the written memorandums only.

However, after

reading the written memorandums, the undersigned requested the
hearing which was granted by the law judge, which request is
referenced in said administrative law judge's findings (R. 28).
8.

That the agreed upon facts in said stipulation are

quoted on pages 3 and 4 of appellant's brief.
DATED this 4th day of April, 1988.

David H. Day

Subscribed and sworn to before
1988.

My Commission Expires:

*"

this 4th day of April,

Notary Publ:
Residing in/ Slalt Lake City, Utah
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have the administrative law judge come down and be present, but
he could decide it based on the said stipulated facts and written
memorandums of law to be filed.
5.

That he presented a letter addressed to his said client

from himself, dated February 13, 1986, and suggested to Mr. Cook
and Mr. Hales that it was his understanding that the facts of the
case were as represented on the first two pages of said letter.
Mr. Yeaman affirmed that those were the facts, and he answered
additional questions of Mr. Hales or Mr. Cook.

Mr. Hales and Mr.

Cook read said factual description and both indicated that that
would be used as the stipulated facts and delivered to the
administrative law judge.

It was also agreed that the Division

would file its memorandum first, the undersigned would file
second, and the Division would file a reply, and dates were
agreed upon for such filings.
6.

That he personally handed said stipulated facts to the

Division's said representatives, with the understanding bhat such
would become part of the record.

That he had never at any time

prior to the Final Order of the Department of Business Requlation, dated February 18, 1987, had any indication iron: any
attorney or other personnel of, or representing, the Division
that such was not the case, and that he did not learn that it had
apparently been omitted by the Division until after the Final
Order was entered while preparing for the District Court review.
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signments as provided for in Paragraphs 4
and 5 hereof."
The defenses, based on this paragraph of
the contract, were presented by a general
demurrer to the complaint, which was
overruled; by the second defense in the
answer; by motion for nonsuit and motion
for new trial. The substance of other material parts of the contract is to the effect
that plaintiff should give to defendant a
complete list of all its customers, and on
the first of each month a list of new customers to whom oil was furnished the
month preceding, and, at any time that defendant felt insecure, defendant was entitled to an assignment of the accounts of
plaintiff, and, if such assignment was not
made, defendant could notify plaintiff's
customers.
From a casual reading of the contract, it
is apparent that both parties realized the
uncertainty of full performance and made
provision therefor, in that certain benefits were to inure to either party upon nonperformance by the other. The relative
rights of the parties were determined by
their own words of agreement in paragraph 8, which undoubtedly were intended to, and do, control as to damages, if
any. No other purpose would have called
for such provisions of the contract, and,
when so fixed and agreed upon, it was an
establishment of the limitations of the
benefits and liabilities, and the remedy thus
provided is to the exclusion of all others.
If these were improvident provisions of
the contract, we cannot offer a substitute.
Only a breach of these conditions or an
interference with their performance would
provide grounds for damage. From the
record herein, we find that no such breach
was alleged or proven.
Plaintiff centered its cause of action upon paragraph 1 of the contract, and
claimed its damages on the failure of defendant to deliver. If this was the entire
contract, a proper measure of relief might
be available. Plaintiff cannot select certain portions of the contract, beneficial to
it, to the exclusion of other provisions it
had made and agreed upon. It is evident
that the parties themselves understood the
uncertainties surrounding the performance
of this contract and meant by its provisions
to allow for—upon consideration to be
given—the failure of performance. This
intent is so apparent from the contract

that it controls its construction, and effect must be given to the document as a
whole.
Plaintiff, in failing to base its cause of
action on the remedy provided in the contract in case of nonperformance, failed to
state a cause of action, and the demurrer
of defendant to the complaint should have
been sustained.
Error has been assigned to the giving of
alleged improper instructions and to fixing
an erroneous measure of damage. In view
of the conclusions above reached, it is unnecessary to discuss these assignments.
Judgment is reversed, with directions to
sustain the demurrer, and for such further
proceedings as may be proper in accordance with the views herein expressed
BOUCK, J., dissents.

ANDREWS v. CHASE el al.
No. 5504.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 25,1935.
1. Statutes <S=>206
In construction of statute, effect must be
given to all language used in act when possible.
2. Licenses $=9l8t/?
Disposal of securities by gift held not
within statute regulating sales of corporate
securities (Laws 1925, c. 87, as amended).
3. Corporations <§=>90(2)
Where articles of incorporation provide
that stockholders of corporation shall not
be liable for corporate debts, owner of full
paid stock is not liable for unpaid assessment,
which can be enforced only by sale of stock
or so much thereof as may be necessary to
pay assessment.!
4. Appeal and error €=»9I7(I)
Supreme Court must assume truth of allegations of complaint for purpose of demurrer.
5. Licenses €=»39
Gift of corporation's stock to public with
understanding that assessment would be lev-

€=>For other cases see same topic and KEY Ni MBER to all Key Number Digests and Indexes

iDotson v. Hoggan, 4 Utah, 295, 140 P. 12&

ANDREWS v. CHASE
49 P. (2d)

ied for development of corporate assets, but
that persons to whom stock was given were
not obligated to pay such assessment, held not
"sale" or "attempt to sell" stock within Securities Act, and hence agreement with statistician who was employed to assist in disposition of stock was not void under terms of Securities Act (Laws 1925, c. 87, §f 2, 7, 10, 27).
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Sale/' see Words & Phrases.]
6. Gifts <S=>5(2)
Gift does not become sale merely because
donor hopes to receive something for gift
EPHRAIM HANSON, J., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake
County; James W. McKinney, Judge*
Action by Hal Andrews against Ogden
C. Chase and others. From a judgment
dismissing the action, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Allen T. Sanford and E. A. Rogers,
both of Salt Lake City, for appellant
Van Cott, Riter & Farnsworth, Cheney,
Jensen & Marr, and Ray McCarty, all of
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
ELIAS H A N S E N , Chief Justice.
In the court below defendants' demurrers to plaintiffs amended complaint were
sustained.
Plaintiff refused to further
amend his complaint, whereupon defendants moved to dismiss the action. The
motion was granted and the action dismissedo Plaintiff appeals. He assigns as
errors the order sustaining the demurrers
and the order dismissing the action. It is
in substance alleged in the complaint: That
defendant companies are, and at all times
alleged in the complaint were, Utah corporations; that plaintiff is, and at all times
alleged in the complaint was, a statistician,
analyst, and adviser of the value of stocks,
bonds, and various kinds of securities and
as such engaged in business at Salt Lake
City, Utah; that at the times complained
of plaintiff had a list of numerous clients
to whom he was, and for two years had
been, sending weekly letters advising them
of his opinion and analysis of mining stocks
and other securities; that during the month
of April, 1932, defendant Ogden C Chase
was a director, secretary and treasurer,
and defendant S. F. Hunt was a director
ana the president, of defendant corporation Rio Tinto Copper Company. Para-
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graph 4 of the amended complaint contains
the allegations which form the basis for
the questions which divide the parties. W e
quote it in full:
"That on or about the 1st day of April,
1931 the said defendant Rio Tinto Copper
Company, was desirous of giving some of
its shares of treasury stock to such members of the public as would receive it, upon the understanding that the Rio Tinto
Copper Company would for the purpose
of carrying on development of said property levy one two-cent assessment and
three one-cent assessments, or as many
thereof as might be necessary to finance
the development of its mining property and
with the understanding that the persons
receiving said stock were not obligated to
pay such assessments, or any of them, and
on or about said date the said Rio Tinto
Copper Company and the said Ogden C.
Chase and said S. F. Hunt, knowing that
the said plaintiff had a large number of
clients residing outside of Utah who reposed confidence in the judgment of the
plaintiff and who relied upon the advice
of the plaintiff with reference to the value
of mining stocks and other securities, entered into an agreement with the said
plaintiff wherein and whereby the said defendants, Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C. Chase and S. F. Hunt, agreed to
and with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff
would assist the said Rio Tinto Copper
Company in placing its treasury stock with
his clients residing outside of Utah upon
the aforesaid basis, the said defendants,
Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C
Chase, and S. F. Hunt, would transfer,
convey, and deliver to the plaintiff 20,000
shares of the Class A capital stock of the
said Rio Tinto Copper Company after the
aforesaid assessments or as many thereof
as might be necessary, had been levied and
paid; that the said Rio Tinto Copper Company levied one two-cent assessment and
three one-cent assessments, assessment No.
4 having been levied on or about the 17th
day of March, 1932, and the collection of
said assessment having been consummated
on or about the 17th day of May, 1932; that
pursuant to said agreement the plaintiff
immediately commenced upon said work,
circularized his said clients frequently and
wrote personal letters to about one-hundred twenty-five of his clients, such circulars and letters all having been delivered
outside of Utah, recommending the acquisition of the said stock of the said Rio Tinto

€=>For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes
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Copper Company upon the aforesaid basis,
and as a result of the efforts of the plaintiff approximately 145,000 shares of stock
were accepted by plaintiff's customers;
that the plaintiff duly performed all things
in said contract upon his part to be performed."
It is further alleged in the complaint
that in October, 1932, defendant Mountain
City Copper Company acquired all of the
assets and property of the defendant Rio
Tinto Copper Company, and in consideration therefor agreed to exchange its stock
share for share to the stockholders of the
Rio Tinto Copper Company and to assume
all contracts and liabilities of the Rio Tinto Copper Company; that plaintiff has
made demand of defendants that they issue to him the 20,000 shares of stock which
they agreed to convey to him, but defendants have failed and refused, and continue to refuse, to deliver the stock. Plaintiff prays judgment that defendants deliver
the stock, or, if delivery thereof cannot
be had, that he be awarded judgment for
the value thereof.
One of the principal questions of law upon which the parties divide is whether or
not the alleged agreement relied upon by
the plaintiff is or is not void. Defendants
contend that the alleged agreement was
and is unenforceable and void because inhibited by the provisions of Laws of Utah
1925, c. 87, p. 171, which act is sometimes
referred to as the Securities Act, and is
commonly known as "the Blue Sky Law."
Plaintiff contends that the agreement
pleaded in his complaint did not involve
a sale, and therefore was not within the
provisions of the act.
In the main, the present law touching
the matter in hand is the same as it was
at the time plaintiff alleges that he entered
into the. agreement sued upon. Rev. St.
Utah 1933, title 82, chap. 1, p. 981 (82-1-1 et
seq.). We quote from chapter 87, Laws
of Utah 1925, such provisions of the act
as we deem bear upon this controversy:
"When used in this Act the following
terms shall, unless the text otherwise indicates, have the following respective
meanings: * * *
"'Sale' or 'sell' shall include every disposition, or attempt to dispose, of a security or interest in a security for value.
Any security given or delivered with, or
as a bonus on account of, any purchase of
securities or any other thing, shall be conclusively presumed to constitute a part of

the subject of such purchase, and to have
been sold for value. 'Sale' or 'sell' shall
also include an exchange, an attempt to
sell, an option of sale, a solicitation of sale,
a subscription or an offer to sell, directly
or by an agent, or a circular, letter, advertisement or otherwise.
" 'Dealer* shall include every person other
than a salesman who in this State engages
either for all or part of his time directly
or through an agent in the business of selling any securities issued by another person
or purchasing or otherwise acquiring such
securities, from another for the purpose of
reselling them or of ottering them for sale
to the public, or offering, buying, selling or
otherwise dealing or trading in securities as
agent or principal for a commission or at
a profit, or who deals in futures or differences in market quotations of prices or
values of any securities or accepts margins
on purchases or sales or pretended purchases or sales of such securities provided
that the word 'dealer* shall not include a
person having no place of business in this
State who sells or offers to sell securities
exclusively to brokers or dealers actually
engaged in buying and selling securities as
a business.
" 'Issuer* shall mean and include every
person who proposes to issue, has issued,
or shall hereafter issue any security, Any
natural person who acts as a promoter for
and on behalf of a corporation, trust or
unincorporated association or partnership
of any kind to be formed shall be deemed
an issuer.
"'Salesman' shall include every natural
person, other than a dealer, employed or
appointed or authorized by a dealer, or
issuer to sell securities in any manner in
this State. The partners of a partnership
and the executive officers of a corporation
or other association registered as a dealer
shall not be salesmen within the meaning
of this definition." Section 2.
"All securities required by this Act to be
registered before being sold in this State,
and not entitled to registration by notification shall be registered only by qualification in the manner provided by this section." Section 7.
"No dealer or salesman shall engage in
business in this State as such dealer or
salesman or sell any securities including securities exempted in Section 3 of this Act,
except in transactions exempt under Section 4, of this Act unless he has been registered as a dealer or salesman in the of-
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fice of the commission pursuant to the provisions of this section." Section 10.
"Any person, issuer, dealer, agent or
salesman, who, not being at the time exempt or registered pursuant to the provisions of this Act, in any manner or
by any means shall issue, sell, assign,
transfer or offer to or negotiate for the
issuance, sale or assignment, or transfer,
of any securities said securities not being
exempt or registered at the time of such
issuance sale assignment or transfer, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall
be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not
less than $100.00 or more than $10,000.00,
or by imprisonment in the State prison for
a term of not more than ten years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment" Section
27.
[1] The stock here involved is not one
of the kinds oi securities which are exempt
from the provisions of the Securities Act.
Appellant does not contend otherwise. What
he does contend is that the act merely regulates the sale of securities and has no
application whatever to securities which
are given awayc It will be observed that
"sale or sell" is defined as every disposition, or attempt to dispose, of a security
or interest in a security for value. The
words "for value" are descriptive of, and
constitute a limitation on, the kind of
transactions which the Securities Act was
intended to regulate. It is a cardinal rule
in the construction of a statute that, when
possible, effect must be given to all of the
language used in an act. If the Legislature had intended that the words "sale or
sell" should include "gift or give," it would
not have limited the former words to such
disposals, or attempted disposals of securities as are made for value. The second
sentence of section 2, subd 3, further indicates a legislative intention to limit the
act to transactions where securities are
disposed of for value. It provides that, if
one security is transferred for value and
another shall be given or delivered as a
bonus, the latter "shall be conclusively
presumed to constitute a part of the subject of such purchase." The provision of
the act last quoted was evidently intended to prevent evasion of the act by one or
more of the parties to a transaction involving the transfer of security from contending that such transfer was a gift in a
transaction where the transferor may have
received value for the stock disposed of
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by him. Had the lawmaking power intended that the act should apply to gifts
of securities, it would have been a simple
matter to have so provided. In such case
there would have been no occasion for the
provision with respect to the giving or delivering of security as a bonus "on account
of, any purchase of securities or any other
thing," being "conclusively presumed to
constitute a part of the subject of such
purchase."
It will also be observed that the provisions of the act defining a dealer, an issuer,
and a salesman are confined to those who
have to do with the disposal of securities
by means of a sale, and is silent as to such
persons as may participate in the disposal
of securities by gift. So also the only
securities which the act requires to be registered are such as "shall be sold within
this State." Section 5. To hold that the act
applies to securities which are given awa>
would be to read into the act a meaning
which is not expressed or implied by the
language used. On the contrary, the clear
implication to be drawn from a number of
the provisions of the act is that gifts of securities were not intended to be covered
by the act
[2-6] It will be noted that it is in substance alleged in the complaint that plaintiff was employed to assist in giving the
stock of the defendant Rio Tinto Copper
Company to such members of the public
as were willing to accept it; that the stock
was so given with the understanding that
the company would levy assessments for
the development of its mine, but that the
persons securing the same were under no
obligation to pay such assessments. It is
contended by respondents that in giving
away the stock with the knowledge that assessments would be levied thereon, and with
the hope that such assessments would be
paid by the donees, was, within the meaning of the Securities Act, an attempt to
sell the stock. If, in the transaction under
review, the transferees had agreed to pay
the future assessments when levied, it
would seem reasonably clear that the
transaction would have been a sale. The
allegations of the complaint, however, allege that there was no such agreement In
the absence of an agreement to pay assessments, the transferees of the stock
were not obligated to pay the assessments.
The law is settled in this jurisdiction that,
when the articles of incorporation provide
that the stockholders thereof shall not be
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liable for the corporate debts, the owner
of ,full paid stock of such corporation is
not liable for an unpaid assessment. ..The
qnly means of enforcing the assessment is
by„a sale of the stock or so much thereof
asbmay be necessary to j>ay the assess? J ? V H2 tS °? y,: Hoggan,.44 Utah, 295
140 P. 128. In light of the allegations of
the comRlaint that the persons to whom the
stock was given assumed no liability to pay
assessments, it is to be assumed the articles
of incorporation of the defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company' contain a provision
that the stockholders thereof were not liable for its debts. Such a provision is
usually contained in the articles of incorpbration of mining companies. If the allegations of the complaint are true, which
we must assume for the purpose of demurrer, it follows that there was neither a sale
nor an attempt to sell the stock in question.
X'mere hope or anticipation that the transferees of the stock would pay the assessments if and when levied may not be'said
ttf be a disposition or an attempt to dispose of the stock "for value within the

or-in the results.therein reached. Hence!
this dissent.
; . A , s t a t e d i n ^prevailing opinionAthel
defendants to the^c^J
demurrers of ^
^
pontiff Vavf
w e r e sustaine<L
Thc
^ e k c t e d t o stafld o n h i s c o m p l a i m v l j £
case was dismissed. Plaintiff appeals^Th'e
^ ^ on ^
, are merefore detfim i n c d b y t h e suffici
o f ± t allegation?
-,rTUJ
o f A e c o m plaint
' "-78
It " assumed by the plaintiff, and 'also
°y the prevailing opinion that it is alleged^
m the
complaint that the defendants wert
making gifts of the capital stock of-the"
Rio Tinto Copper Company to such men#
*>ers of the public as would accept the
» m e - In my opinion, the allegation of th«;
complaint does not justify such conclusioa<
I"1"5 complaint merely asserts that the cbpi
P«" company "was desirous of giving some
9* >« shares of stock to such members ,of
the P«»hc as would receive it upon t h e ^
derstanding that the Rio Tmto Coppejc
Company, would for the purpose of carry*
»ng on development of said property0lev^

* Counsel for the respective parties have
kV,considerable -length argued two other
questions, viz.: Assuming the transaction
alleged in the complaint was a sale within
the meaning of the Securities Act, may
the defendants avail themselves of such
fact to escape liability? Was the transaction alleged in the complaint interstate
commerce and as such not subject to the
provisions of the Act? Having reached
the conclusion that the transaction as alleged by plaintiff is not covered by the provisions of the Securities Act, it becomes
unnecessary to determine the other questions presented. We therefore express no
opinion concerning them. From what has
been said, it follows that the judgment
dismissing the action should be, and it
accordingly is, reversed.
_,.
.
, .
. . . .
This cause is remanded to the district
court of Salt Lake county with directions
to reinstate the action and overrule the
demurrers. Appellant is awarded his costs.
~;FOLLAND, MOFFAT, and WOLFE,
IT concur
.
"
EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice (dissenting).
I am unable to concur either in the
views expressed in the prevailing opinion

- » « * o f "f m m m * P[°P ert y *ad ™ # $ « !
understanding that .Ae persons recemne
**>* s t o c k w e r e n o t ° b h ? e d *° W snch.as^
• « » » « « or any of them.' Nowhere^is
«™« any allegation of any intention^
*»** * *!*» n°T. , s ^
" J *P?WSSt
from w h l c h su<A mtention may be mferred j;
nor
» t h e ? a i \ y allegation from which ^t
* ? ? b e m f e r r c d that »ny k™d °.f d e h ^ c ^
of the
"ockwould be made prior to the
P*? 11 "" °* * « assessments to be levied, ft
1S
^conceivable to assume that the stock
certificates would be executed and issued
promiscuously to any and every person
who might be on plaintiffs nailing list, or
*? w h o m a certificate could be sent by .the
sm, le
P process of depositing the .same m
the mails. The fair inference is that, if
stock
certificates were issued at all, they
were only issued to those particular perknown*
sons w h o would a
t the
^
„
„
would have w
M much
five c e n t s
share if ^
were to kcep
^ $tocL Evcn such an arrangemeat
could in no sense be distorted into a. gift,
granting a sufficient delivery, as there
would still be lacking the necessary inten-'
tion by the copper company to make a gift
"A clear and unmistakable intention oil
the part of the donor to make a gift of his
property is an essential requisite of a gift
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inter vivos. *And this intention must be
inconsistent with any other theory." 28
C. J. 627, § 19.
The only word in the complaint which
might characterize the transaction as a gift
is the word "giving." This word has no
fixed' and definite meaning, so that the
mere use of it would necessarily make a
sufficient allegation of the ultimate fact
of a gift. While the primary meaning of
the word "give" is to bestow a gratuity,
yet it also has a secondary meaning, widely
and frequently employed in ordinary business and other transactions. In Smith v.
Burnet, 35 N. J. Eq. 314, at page 324, the
court says: "The question arises whether
it appears that such possession was delivered with an intention to confer upon him
dominion over the stock as the absolute
owner thereof. Proof of such an intent is
absolutely essential to support the gift * * *
The word 'give' is often used with other
meaning than as evincing an intent to confer the title in the thing delivered"
In Johnston v. Griest, 85 Ind. 503, the
plaintiff sued upon a writing which read:
"This will certify that I do give to Charles
E. Johnston $100, the money to be paid as
soon as my financial condition will allow;
and 4if I, do not live to pay it, I wish it
paid out of my estate," This was held to
be a promise to make a gift and not a promise to pay. The court said: "The word
'give' does not always signify a mere
gratuitous act; at all events it is not one
of those words which have a fixed and
unalterable meaning," Galloway v. Jenkms5 63 N. C. 147; Spencer v0 Potter's
L state, 85 V t 1, 80 A. 821. In Revere Oil
Co, v. Bank of Chillicothe (Tex, Civ.
App.) 255 So W. 219, and in Southern
Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58
S6 E. 67, the words "giving" and "give"
were construed to be synonymous with
"delivering" and "deliver" respectively.
In Crews v. Crews (Mo. Sup.) 240 S. W.
149, 151, it was contended that the word
"give" in a will permitting the executrix
to "give such o'f my children at such
time as she may think proper such of my
property as she may think just and right,"
necessarily implies a gratuity. The court
said: "Such, however, is not the case.
Even if the word 'give* does generally
mean a gift or gratuity, it depends entirely upon the circumstances and the context as to whether that meaning should be
attached to i t The word is used to mean
'deliver/ 'supply/ 'grant/ 'furnish/ 'pay/
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'convey.' * * * We have been unable to find
any case where it is held that the term
necessarily implies a gratuity or a gift
without consideration. On the other hand,
there are cases where it is held that it does
not, necessarily pimply want of consideration. * * * The word must be considered in
the light of circumstances,,"
As a further aid to the proper construction of the complaint, the provisions
of our Constitution and statutes relative
to the issuance of corporate stock should
be considered. Article 12, § 5, of our Constitution provides: "Corporations shall not
issue stock, except to bona fide subscribers
thereof or their assignee. * * * All
fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness
shall be void." The clear purpose of this
provision is to prevent the issuance of "watered stock" and to assure that no corporate
stock will be issued without receiving
something of value therefor. The import
of plaintiff's complaint and his contentions
before *this court are that the persons receiving the copper company's stock were
in no sense subscribers thereto. Indeed,
a u donee { of ; stock from the corporation
could not be a bona fide subscriber therefor. -.In die case of Frame v. Mahoney, 21
Ariz,c0282t ;187,.RtJ584, 586, the Arizona
Supreme. Court construed a provision of
t{ie • Arizona Constitution identical with
ours. It said: "A bona fide subscriber is
one who actually turns over to the corporation * something -of value in lieu of the
stock issued to him."
In a later case, Overlock v. JeromePortland Copper Min, Coo, 29 Arizc 560,
243 P. 400, 401, the same court, after quoting the same constitutional provision,
says: "A proper construction of the language quoted doubtless would be that the
stock in the hands of Frame should be annulled, since he paid nothing for it and
was not a bona fide subscriber. * * * The
evident purpose of the clause, which says,
'No corporation shall issue stock, except to
bona fide subscribers therefor or their
assignees/ was to prevent the issuance of
stock except to parties who paid for it at
its face value, and was intended more for
the protection of creditors of the corporation than otherwise. This same provision
is found in the Constitutions of Washington and Utah, and if we rightly understand
their courts, that is their view. Gordon
v. Cummings, 78 Wash. 515, 139 P. 489;
Rolapp v. Ogden, etc, R. Co., 37 Utah, 540,
110 P. 364."
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#fThe Constitution; of the-rstate*of Washington also"'contains a provision identical
with our provision above quoted. In the
case of Gordon v. Cummings, 78 -Wash.,
515, 139 P. 489, 494, the court of that state
held that the r"holders of unpaid stock
cannot defeat an action for the balance
due by claiming that they hold such stock
as a mere gratuity." The court further

when stojek is once 'full paid,' whetherfin;
moneyf pfroperty, or labor, it may be boughti
and sold at any price, but commercial ^oY^
business Corporations in this state may notv
issue stock to their subscribers formless"
than the face value thereof, which musf'be'
paid fon either in money or property^

"> Fletcher, in Cyclopedia of Corporation^
vol. 11, § 5202, says: "For a corporation
saV
4?:
to issue its stock as a gratuity violates the'
*> "Indeed, it seems to us that the fram- rights of existing stockholders who do not
ers of the Constitution of this state antici- consent, and is a fraud upon subsequent
pated, and intended to prevent, just such subscribers, and upon subsequent creditors'
frauds on the law as was here attempted. who dea^ with it on the faith of its capital*
'Corporations shall not issue stock, except stock."
to bona fide subscribers therefor, or their
It is clear that the issuance and delivery
assignees.' Article 12, § 6. If this means
of its corporate stock by a corporation
anything, it is that one who takes the
stock of a corporation is liable for its value gratuitously and without any consideration
.and that a subscription that is not made in violates the constitutional and statutory^
provisions of this state. Under plaintifFsr
good faith is no subscription.' * * *
theory,r.a!l of the copper company's capital*
^'Within the limit of the authorized stock could have been given away, develop-'
Capital stock, no person can hold a. share ment wojrk done, and debts incurred .with
^Si the stock, by whatever name'it'-may be no one lijable or responsible for the bbliga-|
^called, *without meeting the responsibilities tions this incurred. Such a proceeding*
J
and the liabilities that the law attaches to would be|, in my opinion, directly contrary
such "* holding^ _u To ^ hold otherwise' "wouldto' the~ law of this state. It is not neces*]
^defeat the very'purpose of the law*; for it sary for us to determine, in this case,' fiow~S
would * then be possible,* by "adopting the ever, whjat the legal effect of such viola"^
•very plan that was adopted in this case, to tion would be as between the holders^of,
make all but a-nominal number of the stock and others. It is sufficient to n6t£
shares of the capital stock unresponsive that plaintiffs theory is based entirely"uj&
to the liability put upon it by law."
on such a violation on the part of the cop^
" ,This court in the case of Rolapp v. Og- per company, and he is asking us to give
(ten & N. W. R/Ca, 37 Utah, 540, 110 P. his complaint that effect It is elementary
364, has indicated a construction of our that an agreement will not be construed as
constitutional provision and the statutes involving the performance of something
of the state in harmony with the forego^ forbidden by law when it is open to a coning principles. After quoting said provi- struction that does not involve such violas i o n and referring to those sections of tion. As I have already stated, the comour statutes which are now sections 18-2-6, plaint here in question does not allege a gift'
and sufficient allegations as
18-2-7, and 18-2-13, Rev. St Utah 1933, by appropriate
1
Mr. Justice Frick says: "If we keep in to either of the essential elements of inmind all of our own constitutional and tention oir delivery, and it is not within our
statutory provisions, we think it is mani- province to make any inferences that would
fest that it was the intention both of the lead to a result which the law prohibits.
people who adopted the Constitution and We musj: assume, therefore, that the dethe Legislature who passed the foregoing fendants were disposing, or attempting to
sections that the capital stock of corpora- dispose, of the stock of the copper comtions excepting those created for mining pany for value. Consequently, it is my
and irrigation, shall represent full actual opinion that the word "giving" must be
value either in money or property, and construe^, not as indicating a gratuity, but
further, that the subscribers for stock as synonymous with "delivering."
shall pay 100 cents on the dollar, or its
In view of the foregoing conclusions, it
equivalent, for the stock subscribed for by becomes necessary to consider the word
them, and until so paid that they are liable "assessment" as used in the complaint The
to creditors of the corporation in a prop- transactipns involved in the complaint ocer "proceeding for any balance remaining curred in 1931 and 1932, before the enacP
'unpaid on their subscriptions. No doubt ment of the Revised Statutes of 1933. The,
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plaintiff and the prevailing opinion assume
that this word, as used in the complaint,
necessarily refers to assessements levied
on full paid stock. However, that is not
the case The provisions of sections 900,
901, 902, and 905, Comp. Laws Utah 1917,
as amended in the 1921 Session Laws, c.
22 p. 71, and sections 903, 904, and 919,
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, were then in effect.
The word "assessment" is there used to denote a "call" upon subscribed and unpaid
stock as well as an assessment on full paid
stock, and the same procedure is provided
for the collection of both kinds of "assessments/' In either case the stock may
be sold to pay the assessment Stock thus
sold passes to the purchaser or the corporation, as the case may be. As to an
"assessment" on unpaid stock, at least, under section 919, the company can waive the
sale and sue to collect the delinquent "assessment." The corporation has the option
to sell the stock or proceed by suit to collect on the promise to pay. Having such
option, it could agree with a subscriber
that it would look exclusively to the sale,
and no express or implied promise to pay
the "assessments" need be made. 14 C. J.
537, § 803. A sale and forfeiture of the
stock would preclude- any action against'
the subscriber under such conditions. 14
C J. 650, § 989, Rev. S t 1933, 18-4-1 et
seq., makes the distinction between "calls"
and "assessments" and uses the words in
their respective meanings. It will also be
noted that section 919 is omitted entirely,
and that on a sale of stock for a "call"
the purchaser becomes liable for the subsequent and unpaid "calls."
Since the word "assessment" has a dual
meaning, as indicated and since admittedly
no consideration for the stock was to be
given at the time plaintiff's customers
should indicate their willingness to accept
it, or even after it was delivered, if delivered before the assessments were levied,
and since no gift of title to the stock can
be inferred from the allegations of the
complaint, it necessarily follows that the
"assessments" contemplated were in effect
"calls," which the copper company was
authorized to make and which the holders
of the stock must pay to obtain and keep
title theretOe This conclusion is borne out
by an analysis of the complaint The "assessments" are limited to four in number,
and each is for a particular amount As
to creditors, at least, the company could
not agree in advance that upon the issue
of fully paid but assessable stock it would
49 P.(2d)—40
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or could levy only certain specified assessments. Especially would this be true where
such agreement was made with only certain
persons who acquired the assessable stock.
It is not to be inferred from the complaint
that the only persons who acquired the
assessable stock of the copper company
were those who had this understanding
concerning these four assessments. There
is nothing in the complaint that would
warrant ftie conclusion that the copper
company was disposing of its assessable
stock only through the method by which
plaintiff operated. It is not shown that
his assistance or employment was exclusive
and that the assessable stock was not to
be disposed of by other means. In my
opinion, however, it must be inferred
that the four stipulated assessments were
to be levied only on the stock issued
or to be issued according to said understanding under which plaintiff operated.
The only legitimate construction that can
be placed upon the arrangement thus
pleaded, therefore, is that upon the payment of these "assessments" or "calls" the
stock would be deemed fully paid for.
From what has been said it is clear that
the disposition of the copper company's
stock, as alleged, would be a sale for value
within the definition of that term as stated
in chapter 89, Laws of Utah 1925, as amended by chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1929,
commonly called the Blue Sky Law, Certainly such disposition was an attempt to
dispose of a security for value* It may be
conceded that a gift of stock does not
come within the purview of the Blue Sky
Law. But, as herein shown, to call the
arrangement described in the complaint a
bestowing of gratuitous issues of stock, is
begging the question and fails to distinguish between form and substance. If
this court gives legal sanction to such a
plain and palpable attempt to evade the intent and purpose of our constitutional and
statutory provisions, then indeed will the
doors be wide open to every one who may
resort to the specious expedient of making
"gifts" of stock. The law would be nullified; the legislative regulations intended to
protect the public would be inoperative;
and additional impetus would be given to
the ever present tendency to invent means
to circumvent such regulations.
It must be conceded that the stock here
involved is not exempt from the provisions of the Blue Sky Law. Before it
could be sold, as defined by the law, it
must have been registered with the State
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Securities Commission. There are no allegations in the complaint showing that the
stock disposed of was so registered.
It does not appear from the complaint
that the plaintiff was a dealer as defined by
chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1929. But it is
alleged that plaintiff was to "assist the said
Rio Tinto Copper Company in placing its
treasury stock with his clients residing outside of Utah" upon the basis heretofore
explained; that, as a result of plaintiffs
efforts, approximately 145,000 snares of
stock were accepted by his customers. Under such allegations he would come clearly
within the definition of "agent"; it being
established that the transactions thus involved constituted "sales" within the statutory definition. Under section lOx, c 79,
Laws Utah 1929, "no person shall engage
in business in this State as such agent
to. sell any securities of an issuer as set
forth in this Act unless he has paid a fee
of five dollars ($5.00) and has been registered as an agent in the office of the commission pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter. Every agent before selling, offering to sell or advertising the sale of any
security of an issuer under the provisions
of this Act shall file in the office of the
commission an application for registration
in writing," etc Section 27 of chapter 87,
Laws of Utah 1925, makes it a felony for
an unregistered dealer, salesman, or agent
to sell, or offer for sale, or negotiate for
the sale of, unregistered securities.
Plaintiff is suing for the compensation
he claims he earned in assisting in the disposition of the copper company's stock. He
does not allege that he was registered as
required by the provisions above quoted.
In my opinion, having failed to allege that
the stock which plaintiff assisted in disposing of was not registered, and having failed to allege that he himself was registered,
plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.
The Blue Sky Law was enacted for the
protection of the public It specifically
provides that corporate securities must be
registered before being sold or offered for
sale, and every dealer, salesman, or agent
must be registered before selling: or offering to sell such securities. Selling unregistered securities by an unregistered person is made a felony. Even though the
statute does not expressly so provide, it
must follow that any contract which plaintiff may have had with defendants made
in violation of such provisions is utterly

void. Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery
Co., 61 Utah, 22, 210 P. 201; Levinson v.
Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P. 825, 12 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 575, 11 Ann. Cas. 661; Payne v.
De Vaughn, 77 Cal. App. 399, 246 P.
1069; McKinlay v. Javan Mines Co., 42
Idaho, 770, 248 P. 473; McManus v. Fulton, 85 Mont 170, 278 P. 126, 130, 67 A.
L. R. 690; Zerr v. Lawlor (Tex. Civ.
App.) 300 S. W. 112; Brandenburg v. Miley Petroleum Exploration Co. (D. C.) 16
F. (2d) 933. To permit plaintiff to recover
in this case would be to give legal sanction to, and enforce, an illegal contract.
This the courts will not do. They will
not aid either party to such a contract
Though it may be said that it illy becomes
a defendant to take advantage of such illegality, yet such defense is allowed, and
the courts, even sua sponte, will take cognizance thereof, not for the benefit of
either party, but for the public good and
for the maintenance of their own dignity
and the laws of the state. As stated by
the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of McMullen v. Hoffman, 174
U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct 839, 851, 43 L. Ed.
1117: "To refuse to grant either party to
an illegal contract judicial aid for the enforcement of his alleged rights under it
tends strongly towards reducing the number of such transactions to a minimum. The
more plainly parties understand that when
they enter into contracts of this nature
they place themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that protection
consists in aiding them to enforce such
contracts, the less inclined will they be to
enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid adherence to
the law."
Because section 18, c 79, p. 140, Laws of
Utah 1929, amends the original act and
makes a sale in violation of the act voidable at the election of the purchaser, can
be of no assistance to plaintiff in this case
His rights do not depend upon whether
the purchaser may or may not make such
election. As stated in McManus v. Fulton, supra: "The provisions that the sale
shall be void at the election of the purchaser does not in any wise detract from
the criminal character of the prohibited
act on part of the seller. * * * Under the
law a contract between the seller and the
purchaser was voidable at the option of the
purchaser; but that has no relation whatever to a contract between the issuer and
the agent, solicitor, or broker, or between
the agents of the issuer; such, in the ah
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sence of a compliance with the Act, is
wholly void."
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the
foregoing principles by arguing that the
sales of stock took place outside the state
of Utah and were made in interstate commerce, and therefore were not subject to
our Blue Sky Law. As to the first contention, it is utterly impossible to conclude
from the allegations of the complaint that
the sales were actually made outside the
state of Utah. All that appears is that
plaintiffs customers resided outside this
state and that his correspondence went beyond its boundaries. Plaintiff simply advised his customers and assisted in the
sales. The inference is that, after being
advised by plaintiff to accept the stock, his
correspondents made some kind of communication with the copper company, indicating a desire to accept a certain amount
of its stock. The company's office was
here It would here determine whether
to accept such application, so that the last
act necessary to complete the contract
would necessarily occur here. This would
make it a Utah contract. United States
Bond & Finance Corporation v. National
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Utah, 62, 12 P.
(2d) 758, 17 P. (2d) 238.
Such a transaction would not necessarily
be one in interstate commerce. Plaintiffs
solicitations and advisory letters formed no
part of the sale contract. They were
simply the procuring cause which induced
the making of the contract and the consequent sale. For plaintiff to avoid the effect of the laws of this state under the
theory that what he did and what was done
between his customers and the copper company involved interstate commerce, it was
his duty to allege sufficient facts to bring
himself within the principles thus sought
to be invoked. There are no such allegations in the complaint now before us, even
assuming that corporate stock is an article
subject to interstate commerce, a question
not herein decided. There are no allegations as to when or where delivery of
the stock was made or that the sales necessarily involved the use of interstate commerce to complete the same. It is therefore not necessary to discuss further this
phase of the case. It is my opinion that
the trial court committed no error in sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs
complaint and in dismissing such complaint
upon plaintiffs failure to further plead.
The judgment of the trial court, therefore,
should be sustained.

Utah

947

Addendum.
ELIAS HANSEN, Chief Justice.
The view is expressed in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Ephraim Hanson
that the complaint is fatally defective in
that it affirmatively appears that the alleged transaction relied upon by plaintiff
for recovery contravenes the provisions of
article 12, § 5, of the Constitution of Utah,
and certain statutory provisions calculated
to give effect to such constitutional provisions. The argument is made that the
Rio Tinto Copper Company was, as a matter of law, precluded from giving away
any of its treasury stock. That such is the
law generally may readily be conceded.
It is, however, an easy matter to conceive
of exceptions to the general rule. An illustration will serve to make clear what
we have in mind. Thus, if owners of mining property desire to create a corporation
for the purpose of developing their property, and, instead of having issued to
themselves shares of capital stock of the
corporation in payment for mining claims
conveyed to the corporation, they conclude,
and so provide in the articles of incorporation, that some of the stocks shall be held
by the corporation and later given away
as directed by the incorporators, such an
arrangement may not be said to offend
against the provisions of the Constitution
or the laws referred to in the dissenting
opinion* In such case neither the corporation nor the creditors thereof would have
any just cause to complain because the
stock was transferred to the donees rather
than to the incorporators. Plaintiff, in the
absence of a showing to the contrary, had
a right to assume that the defendant Rio
Tinto Copper Company had authority to
perform its alleged contract The complaint here brought in question is silent
as to what was or what was not contained
in the articles of incorporation of the defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company at the
time complained of. Courts do not take
judicial notice of such matters. If the
defendants, or either of them, desire to
interpose the defense that the defendant
Rio Tinto Copper Company was without
authority to enter into the alleged contract here sued upon, they may do so by
answer The complaint does not affirmatively show that such a defense is available to defendants.
Moreover, this action was brought against
the personal defendants Ogden C. Chase
and S. F. Hunt as well as the corporation
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defendants. It is alleged in the complaint
that the contract sued upon was made with
the Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C.
Chase, and S. F. Hunt. The mere fact that
the defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company
may be precluded from giving away its
stock would not preclude plaintiff from recovering, from the personal defendants,
compensation for services lawfully rendered pursuant to the contract of employment.
Even though the defense of ultra vires is
available to the defendant company0, it is
difficult to perceive how such a defense is
available to the individual defendants. The
contract declared on is for services alleged
to have been rendered and not for the enforcement of a promise to make a gift.
No provision of law would be broken and
no public policy would be infringed by the
individual defendants paying plaintiff for
lawful services. If, therefore, the purposes sought to be accomplished by the
contract of employment were lawful, the
individual defendants would not be relieved from liability merely because the defendant company may have exceeded its
authority in entering into the alleged contract. In this connection it may be noted
that the defendants do not attack the complaint either by their demurrer or in their
briefs upon the ground that the complaint
shows on its face that the defendant Rio
Tinto Copper Company exceeded its
authority in entering into the alleged contract of employment
The position is also taken in the dissenting opinion that the allegations in the complaint do not affirmatively show that no
consideration was to be paid for the stock
other than, and in addition to, the allegations with respect to the levy of future assessments. Apparently counsel for the respondents do not so construe the allegations of the complaint The cause was
argued on the theory that the transaction
set out in the complaint constituted a gift
unless the allegations with respect to the
understanding as to future assessments
made it otherwise. Counsel for the parties
having so construed the complaint and
having based their argument on such construction, we should dispose of the question presented for review upon such theory,
unless the language of the complaint demands a different construction. Moreover,
plaintiff was not required to negative the
possibility that the contract sued upon is

beyond any attack that may be urged
against it upon the ground that it is illegal.
Where a contract is shown to have been
entered into, it will be presumed to be
binding upon the parties unless it affirmatively appears otherwise.
"Where the language of an instrument
in writing or the facts of a transaction are
of a character to leave in some doubt what
the party thereto intended should be the
precise nature of the legal effect thereof,
the contract is not to be so construed as to
render it invalid if it is reasonably susceptible of construction that will render it
valid. If reasonably possible the contract
will be so construed as to make it lawful.
It will not be presumed that the parties
intended to violate the law." 2 Elliott on
Contracts, p. 796, § 1520.
So, also, the general rule is that: "The
law does not presume that parties to a contract intend by it to accomplish an illegal
object, but it rather presumes that they intend to accomplish a legal purpose."
The complaint does not show upon its
face that the transfer of the stock to the
transferees was a sale within the meaning
of the act

LOWE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
No. 5645.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 7, 1935.
1. Master and servant <S»398
Employee's failure to file application for
compensation with Industrial Commission
within one year from date of accident and
Injury held to bar his claim for compensation
unless failure was otherwise excused (Rev.
St 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.; 104-2-26).i
2. Master and servant <S»4I7(7)
Findings of Industrial Commission based
upon conflicting evidence that employer was
not estopped to rely upon employee's failure
to file application for compensation within period of limitation, and that employee had not
been mentally incompetent during year following accident and injury, so as to excuse
failure, held binding upon the Supreme Court
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iBodrique* Y. Industrial Commission (Utah) 43 P.(2d) 189.

